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ABSTRACT
Unsupervised node embedding methods (e.g., DeepWalk, LINE, and node2vec)
have attracted growing interests given their simplicity and effectiveness. How-
ever, although these methods have been proved effective in a variety of applica-
tions, none of the existing work has analyzed the robustness of them. This could
be very risky if these methods are attacked by an adversarial party. In this paper,
we take the task of link prediction as an example, which is one of the most funda-
mental problems for graph analysis, and introduce a data poisoning attack to node
embedding methods. We give a complete characterization of attacker’s utilities
and present efficient solutions to adversarial attacks for two popular node embed-
ding methods: DeepWalk and LINE. We evaluate our proposed attack model on
multiple real-world graphs. Experimental results show that our proposed model
can significantly affect the results of link prediction by slightly changing the graph
structures (e.g., adding or removing a few edges). We also show that our proposed
model is very general and can be transferable across different embedding meth-
ods. Finally, we conduct a case study on a coauthor network to better understand
our attack method.
1 INTRODUCTION
Node representations, which represent each node with a low-dimensional vector, have been proved
effective in a variety of applications such as node classification (Perozzi et al., 2014), link pre-
diction (Grover & Leskovec, 2016), and visualization (Tang et al., 2016). Some popular node
embedding methods include DeepWalk (Perozzi et al., 2014), LINE (Tang et al., 2015), and
node2vec (Grover & Leskovec, 2016). These methods learn the node embeddings by preserving
graph structures, which do not depend on specific tasks. As a result, the learned node embeddings
are very general and can be potentially useful to multiple downstream tasks.
However, although these methods are very effective and have been used for a variety of tasks, none
of the existing work has studied the robustness of these methods. As a result, these methods are
susceptible to a risk of being maliciously attacked. Take the task of link prediction in a social
network (e.g., Twitter) as an example, which is one of the most important applications of node
embedding methods. A malicious party may create malicious users in a social network and attack
the graph structures (e.g., adding and removing edges) so that the effectiveness of node embedding
methods is maximally degraded. For example, the attacker may slightly change the graph structures
(e.g., following more users) so that the probability of a specific user to be recommended/linked can
be significantly increased or decreased. Such a kind of attack is known as data poisoning. In this
paper we are interested in the robustness of the node embedding methods w.r.t. data poisoning, and
their vulnerability to the adversarial attacks in the worst case.
We are inspired by existing literature on adversarial attack, which has been extensively studied
for different machine learning systems (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Xiao et al., 2018c;b;a; Xie et al., 2017; Cisse et al.,
2017; Yang et al., 2018). Specifically, it has been shown that deep neural networks are very sensitive
to adversarial attacks, which can significantly change the prediction results by slightly perturbing
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the input data. However, most of existing work on adversarial attack focus on image (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Xiao et al.,
2018c) and text data (Cheng et al., 2018; Jia & Liang, 2017), which are independently distributed
while this work focuses on graph data. There are some very recent work which studied adversarial
attack for graph data (Dai et al., 2018; Zugner et al., 2018). However, these work mainly studied
graph neural networks, which are supervised methods, and the gradients for changing the output
label can be leveraged. Therefore, in this paper we are looking for an approach that is able to attack
the unsupervised node embedding methods for graphs.
In this paper, we introduce a systematic approach to adversarial attacks against unsupervised node
embedding methods. We assume that the attacker can poison the graph structures by either removing
or adding edges. Two types of adversarial goals are studied including integrity attack, which aims
to attack the probabilities of specific links, and availability attack, which aims to increase overall
prediction errors. We propose a unified optimization framework based on projected gradient descent
to optimally attack both goals. In addition, we conduct a case study on a coauthor network to better
understand our attack method. To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We formulate the problem of attacking unsupervised node embeddings for the task of link
prediction and introduce a complete characterization of attacker utilities.
• We propose an efficient algorithm based on projected gradient descent to attack unsuper-
vised node embedding algorithms, specifically DeepWalk and LINE, based on the first
order Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions.
• We conduct extensive experiments on real-world graphs to show the efficacy of our pro-
posed attack model on the task of link prediction. Moreover, results show that our proposed
attack model is transferable across different node embedding methods.
• Finally, we conduct a case study on a coauthor network and give an intuitive understanding
of our attack method.
2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial attack against image classification has been extensively studied in recent years (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Xiao
et al., 2018c;b). However, adversarial attacks against graph have rarely been investigated before.
Existing work (Dai et al., 2018; Zugner et al., 2018) on adversarial attacks on graph are limited to
graph neural networks (Kipf & Welling, 2017), a supervised learning method. Our work, instead,
shows the vulnerabilities of unsupervised methods on graph. Here we briefly summarize previous
work on graph embedding methods and then we will give an overview of adversarial attacks on
graph data. Last, we will show the related work on the connection to matrix factorization.
Unsupervised Learning on Graph Previous work on knowledge mining in graph has mainly
focused on embedding methods, where the goal is to learn a latent embedding for each node in
the graph. DeepWalk (Perozzi et al., 2014), LINE (Tang et al., 2015) and Node2vec (Grover &
Leskovec, 2016) are the three most representative unsupervised methods on graph.
Adversarial Attack on Graph There are a few work on adversarial attack on graph before. Test
time attack on graph convolutional network has been investigated (Dai et al., 2018). Also, poisoning
attack against graph is also studied (Zugner et al., 2018). However, they only consider the attack
against graph convolutional network.
Matrix Factorization Skip-gram model from the NLP community has been shown to be doing
implicit matrix factorization (Levy & Goldberg, 2014). Recently, based on the previous work, it has
been shown that most of the popular unsupervised methods for graph is doing implicit matrix factor-
ization (Qiu et al., 2018). Moreover, poisoning attack has been demonstrated for matrix factorization
problem (Li et al., 2016).
3 PRELIMINARIES
We first introduce the graph embedding problem and link prediction problem. Then we will give an
overview of the two existing algorithms for computing the embedding. Given a graph G = (V,E),
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where V is the node set and |E| is the edge set, the goal of graph embedding methods is to learn a
mapping from V to Rd which maps each node in the graph to a d-dimensional vector. We use A to
denote the adjacency matrix of the graph G. For each node i, we use Ωi to denote node i’s neighbor.
X represents the learnt node embedding matrix where Xi is the embedding of node i.
In link prediction, the goal is to predict the missing edges or the edges that are most likely to emerge
in the future. Formally, given a set of node pair T ∈ V × V , the task is to predict a score for each
node pair. In this paper, we compute the score of each edge from the cosine similarity matrix XXT .
Now we briefly review two popular graph embedding methods: DeepWalk (Perozzi et al., 2014) and
LINE (Tang et al., 2015). DeepWalk extends the idea of Word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) to graph,
where it views each node as a word and use the generated random walks on graph as sentences.
Then it uses Word2vec to get the node embeddings. LINE learns the node embeddings by keeping
both the first-order proximity (LINE1st), which describes local pairwise proximity, and the second-
order proximity (LINE2nd) for sampled node pairs. For DeepWalk and LINE2nd, there is a context
embedding matrix computed together with the node embedding matrix. We use Y to denote the
context embedding matrix.
Previous work (Qiu et al., 2018) has shown that DeepWalk and LINE2nd is implicitly doing matrix
factorization.
• DeepWalk is solving the following matrix factorization problem:
log
(
vol(G)
( 1
T
T∑
i=1
(D−1A)r
)
D−1
)− log b = XY T (1)
• LINE2nd is solving the following matrix factorization problem:
log
(
vol(G)D−1AD−1
)− log b = XY T (2)
where vol(G) =
∑
Aij is the volume of graph G, D is the diagonal matrix where each element
represents the degree of the corresponding node, T is the context window size and b is the number
of negative samples. We use Z to denote the matrix that DeepWalk and LINE2nd is factorizing. We
denote Ω = {(i, j) : Zij 6= 0} as the observable elements in Z when solving matrix factorization
and Ωi = {j : Zij 6= 0} as the nonzero elements in row i of Z. With these notations defined, we
now give a unified formulation for DeepWalk and LINE2nd:
min
X,Y
‖RΩ(Z −XY T )‖2F (3)
where [RΩ(A)]ij isAij if (i, j) ∈ Ω and 0 otherwise, ‖A‖2F denotes the squared Frobenious norm
of matrix A.
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we introduce the attack model, including attacker’s action, attacker’s utilities and the
constraints on the attacker. We assume that the attacker can manipulate the poisoned graph G by
adding or deleting edges. In this paper, we consider these two type of manipulation: adding edges
and deleting edges respectively. We use Gadv to denote the poisoned graph.
We characterize two kinds of adversarial goals:
Integrity attack: Here the attacker’s goal is either to increase or decrease the probability (similarity
score) of a target node pair. For example, in social network, the attacker may be interested in
increasing (or decreasing) the probability that a friendship occurs between two people. Also, in
recommendation system, an attacker associated with the producer of a product may be interested
to increase the probability of recommending the users with that specific product. Specifically, the
attacker aims to change the probability of the edge connected with a pair of nodes whose embedding
is learnt from the poisoned graph Gadv .
For integrity attack, we consider two kinds of constraints on the attacker: 1. Direct Attack: the
attacker can only manipulate edges adjacent to the target node pair; 2. Indirect Attack: the attacker
can only manipulate edges without connecting to the target node pair.
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Availability attack Here the adversarial goal of availability attack is to reduce the prediction per-
formance over a test set consisting of a set of node pairs T ∈ V × V . (Here T consists of both
positive examples Tpos indicating the existence of edges, and negative examples Tneg for the ab-
sence of edges). In this paper, we choose average precision score (AP score) to evaluate the attack
performance. Specifically, we consider the attacker whose goal is to decrease the AP score over T
by adding small perturbation to a given graph.
5 ATTACKING UNSUPERVISED GRAPH EMBEDDING
In this section we show our algorithm for computing the adversarial strategy. Given that DeepWalk
and LINE is implicitly doing matrix factorization, we can directly derive the back-propogated gra-
dient based on the first order KKT condition. Our algorithm has two steps: 1. Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) step: gradient descent on the weighted adjacency matrix. 2. Projection step: pro-
jection of weighted adjacency matrix onto {0, 1}|V |×|V |. We first describe the projected gradient
descent step and then we describe the projection method we use to choose which edge to add or
delete.
5.1 PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT (PGD)
Based on the matrix factorization formulation above, we describe the algorithm we use to generate
the adversarial graph. The core part of our method is projected gradient descent (PGD) step. In this
step, the adjacency matrix is continuous since we view the graph as a weighted graph, which allows
us to use gradient descent.
First we describe the loss function we use. We use L(X) to denote the loss function. For integrity
attack, L is±[XXT ]ij where (i, j) is the target node pair. (Here the + or− sign depends on whether
the attacker wants to increase or decrease the score of the target edge.) For availability attack, the
loss function is
∑
(i,j)∈Tpos [XX
T ]ij−
∑
(i,j)∈Tneg [XX
T ]ij . The update of the weighted adjacency
matrix A in iteration t is as follows:
At+1 = ProjA(A
t − st · ∇AL) (4)
Here Proj is the projection function which projects the matrix to [0, 1] space and st is the step size
in iteration t. The non-trivial part is to compute∇AL. We note that
∇AL = ∇XL · ∇AX (5)
The computation of∇XL is trivial. Now to compute∇AX , using the chain rule, we have: ∇AX =
∇ZX · ∇AZ. First we show how to compute∇ZX .
For the matrix factorization problem defined in Eq. 3, using the KKT condition, we have:∑
j∈Ωi
(Zij −XiY Tj )Yj = 0 (6)
∂Xi
∂Zij
= (
∑
j′∈Ωi
Yj′Y
T
j′ )
−1Yj (7)
Next we show how to compute∇AZ for DeepWalk and LINE separately. In the derivation of∇AZ,
we view vol(G) and D as constant.
DeepWalk We show how to compute∇AZ for DeepWalk. For DeepWalk, From Eq. 1:
Z = log
(
vol(G)
( 1
T
T∑
i=1
(D−1A)r
)
D−1
)− log b (8)
Now to compute ∇AZ, let P = D−1A, then we only need to derive ∇PP r for each r ∈ [1, T ].
Note that (P r)′ =
∑r
k=1 P
k−1P ′P r−k. Then since computing ∇AP and ∇PZ is easy, once we
have∇PP r, we can compute ∇AZ.
LINE We show the derivation of∇AZ for LINE2nd:
Z = log(vol(G)D−1AD−1)− log b (9)
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since Zij = log(vol(G)d−1i Aijd
−1
j )− log b where di = Dii. We have:
∇Zij
∇Aij =
1
Aij
(10)
Once we have∇ZL and ∇LZ, we can compute ∇AX .
5.2 PROJECTION
In the Projected Gradient Descent step, we compute a weighted adjacency matrix Aopt. We use
Aorg to denote the adjacency matrix of the clean graph. Therefore we need to project it back to
{0, 1}|V |×|V |. Now we describe the projection method we use, which is straightforward. First, we
show our projection method for an attacker that can add edges. To add edges, the attacker needs to
choose some cells in S = {(i, j) | Aorgij = 0} and turn it into 1. Our projection strategy is that
the attacker chooses the cells (i, j) in S where Aoptij is closest to 1 as the candidate set of edges to
add. For deleting edges, it works in a similar way. The only difference is that we start from the cells
that are originally 1 in Aorg and choose the cells that are closest to 0 in Aopt as the candidate set of
edges to delete.
Now we briefly discuss when to use the projection step. A natural choice is to project once after the
projected gradient descent step. Another choice is to incorporate the projection step into the gradient
descent computation where we project every k iterations. The second projection strategy induces
less loss in the projection step and is more accurate for computation but can take more iterations to
converge than the first projection strategy. In our experiments, we choose the first projection strategy
for its ease of computation.
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we show the results of poisoning attack against DeepWalk and LINE on real-world
graph datasets. In the experiments, we denote our poisoning attack method as ‘Opt-attack’. We
evaluate our attack method on three real-world graph datasets: 1). Facebook (Leskovec & Mcauley,
2012): a social networks with 4039 nodes and 88234 edges. 2). Cora (Sen et al., 2008): a citation
network with 2708 nodes and 2708 edges. 3). Citeseer (Giles et al., 1998): a citation network with
2110 nodes and 7336 edges.
Baselines We compare with several baselines: (1) random attack: this baseline is general and used
for both integrity attack and availability attack. We randomly add or remove edges; (2) personalized
PageRank (Bahmani et al., 2010): this baseline is only used for integrity attack. Given a target edge
(A,B), we use personalized PageRank to calculate the importance of the nodes. Given a list of
nodes ranked by their importance, e.g., (x1, x2, x3, x4, ...), we select the edges which connect the
top ranked nodes to A or B, i.e., (A, x1), (B, x1), (A, x2), (B, x2), ...; (3) degree sum: this baseline
is used for availability attack. We rank the node pair by the sum of degree of its two nodes. Then we
add or delete the node pair with the largest degree sum. (4) shortest path: this baseline is used for
availability attack. We rank the edge by the number of times that it is on the shortest paths between
two nodes in graph. Then we delete the important edges measured by the number of shortest paths
in graph that go through this edge.
In our experiments, we choose 128 as the latent embedding dimension. We use the default parameter
settings for DeepWalk and LINE. We generate the test set and validation set with a proportion of 2:1
where positive examples are sampled by removing 15% of the edges from the graph and negative
examples are got by sampling an equal number of node pairs from the graph which has no edge
connecting them. For both our attack and random attack, we guarantee that the attacker can’t directly
modify any node pairs in the target set.
6.1 INTEGRITY ATTACK
For each attack scenario, we choose 32 different target node pairs and use our algorithm to generate
the adversarial graph. For increasing the score of the target edge, the target node pair is randomly
sampled from the negative examples in the test set. For decreasing the score of the target edge,
the target node pair is randomly sampled from the positive examples in the test set. We report the
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average score increase and compare it with the random attack baseline. We consider two kinds of
attacker’s actions: adding or deleting edges and two constraints: direct attack and indirect attack.
Results for Citeseer dataset are deferred to the appendix.
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Figure 1: Result for direct integrity attack on two datasets. The first line contains the results for
Facebook dataset. The second line contains the results for Cora dataset. The format “Method —
Type —Direction ” is used to label the each sub-caption. “Method” refers to embedding method
while “Type” refers to adding or deleting edges to poison the graph. “Direction” refers to increasing
or decreasing the similarity score of the target node pair. This notation is also used in Figure 2, 3, 4.
Adding edges We consider the adversary which can only add edges. Figure 1 shows the results
under direct attack setting. In Figure 1a 1c 1e 1g, when the adversarial goal is to increase the score
of the target node pair, we find that our attack method outperforms the random attack baseline by a
significant margin. We also plot the personalized pagerank baseline. We can see this second base-
line we propose is a very strong baseline, with attack performance the same level as our proposed
method. To further understand it, we analyze the edges we add in this attack scenario. We find the
following pattern: if the target node pair is (i, j), then our attack tends to add edges from node i to
the neighbors of node j and also from node j to the neighbors of node i. This is intuitive because
connecting to other node’s neighbors can increase the similarity score of two nodes. In Figure 1d 1h,
when the adversarial goal is to decrease the score of target node pair, our method is better than the
random attack baseline for attacking LINE. For attacking DeepWalk (figure 1b 1f), the algorithm is
able to outperform, on Facebook dataset (figure 1b), our attack is better than the random baseline
when the number of added edges is large. Although for Cora (figure 1f) our attack is close to the
random attack baseline, we note that in this attack case, random attack is already powerful and can
lead to large drop (e.g. 0.8) in similarity score.
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Figure 2: Result for indirect integrity attack against DeepWalk on two datasets where the action of
attacker is adding edges.
Figure 2 shows our result of indirect attack. We can see that for DeepWalk, even if the attacker can’t
modify the edges adjacent to the target node pair, it can still manipulate the score of the target edge
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with a few edges added. We also analyze the edges our algorithm chooses when the adversarial goal
is to increase the score of the target node pair (i, j) (the case in figure 2a 2c), we find that our attack
tends to add edges between the neighbors of node i and the neighbors of node j. It also follows the
intuition that connecting the neighbor of two nodes can increase the similarity of two nodes. When
the goal is to decrease the score (figure 2b 2d), our attack is still better than random baseline by a
noticeable margin.
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Figure 3: Result for direct integrity attack against two methods on two datasets where the action of
the attack is deleting edges.
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Figure 4: Result for indirect integrity attack against DeepWalk on two datasets where the action of
the attacker is deleting edges.
Deleting edges Now we consider the adversary which can delete existing edges. Figure 3 sum-
marizes our result for direct attack. We can see that our attack method works well for attacking
DeepWalk (figure 3a 3b 3e 3f). The large variance may be because that different edges have dif-
ferent sensitivity to deleting edges. Also, we notice that LINE is more robust to deleting edges,
with average magnitude of score increase(decrease) lower than DeepWalk. Figure 4 summarizes
our results for indirect attack. Still, on average, our attack is able to outperform the random attack
baseline.
6.2 AVAILABILITY ATTACK
In this part, we show the results for availability attack. We report our results on two dataset: Cora and
Citeseer. Results for Citeseer are deferred to the appendix. For both datasets, we choose the test set
to be attack. Table 1 summarizes our result. We can see that our attack almost always outperforms
the baselines. When adding edges, our optimization attack outperforms all other baselines by a
significant margin. When deleting edges, we can see that LINE is more robust than DeepWalk. In
general, we notice the that adding edges is more powerful than deleting edges in our attack.
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Action Model Baseline Attack Method
# added/deleted edges
25 50 100 150 200 250 300
Add
DeepWalk 0.917
random 0.922 0.923 0.920 0.919 0.923 0.922 0.922
degree sum 0.915 0.913 0.909 0.904 0.906 0.906 0.904
Opt-attack 0.832 0.773 0.666 0.597 0.559 0.532 0.503
LINE 0.909
random 0.908 0.908 0.913 0.900 0.901 0.903 0.905
degree sum 0.903 0.904 0.899 0.890 0.886 0.886 0.888
Opt-attack 0.898 0.892 0.886 0.846 0.826 0.803 0.766
Delete
DeepWalk 0.917
random 0.916 0.917 0.921 0.918 0.920 0.914 0.913
degree sum 0.917 0.918 0.919 0.920 0.922 0.918 0.916
shortest path 0.916 0.919 0.917 0.918 0.922 0.921 0.924
Opt-attack 0.897 0.892 0.876 0.866 0.853 0.838 0.835
LINE 0.909
random 0.901 0.899 0.892 0.901 0.898 0.894 0.886
degree sum 0.903 0.904 0.908 0.919 0.911 0.890 0.888
shortest path 0.903 0.904 0.908 0.919 0.911 0.890 0.889
Opt-attack 0.915 0.909 0.898 0.890 0.876 0.859 0.861
Table 1: Results for availability attack on Cora dataset. Here we report the AP score.
6.3 TRANSFERABILITY
In this part, we show that our attack can be transferred across different embedding methods. Besides
DeepWalk and LINE, we choose another three embedding methods to test the transferability of our
approach: 1. Variational Graph Autoencoder(GAE) (Kipf & Welling, 2016); 2. Spectral Cluster-
ing (Tang & Liu, 2011); 3. Node2Vec (Grover & Leskovec, 2016). For GAE, we use the default
setting as in the original paper. For Node2Vec, we first tune the parameters p, q on a validation set
and use the best p, q for Node2Vec.
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.559 0.535 0.544 0.610 0.696
0.842 0.826 0.859 0.894 0.891
(a) Cora-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.853 0.867 0.867 0.862 0.914
0.894 0.876 0.899 0.913 0.927
(b) Cora-Del
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.493 0.463 0.496 0.569 0.701
0.703 0.658 0.682 0.779 0.789
(c) Citeseer-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.867 0.842 0.888 0.910 0.909
0.877 0.874 0.910 0.921 0.935
(d) Citeseer-Add
Figure 5: Result for transferability analysis of our attack on two datasets, where the number of
added/deleted edges is 200. X-axis indicates the method the attack is evaluated on. Y-axis includes
the methods to generate the attack and also the baseline. The format “Dataset — Type ” here is used
to label the each sub-caption. “Dataset” refers to dataset while “Type” refers to attacker’s action.
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Figure 5 shows our result for transferability test of our attack, where the number of added(deleted)
edges is 200. Results when the number of added(deleted) edges is 100 and 300 are deferred to the
appendix. Comparing Figure 5a 5c and Figure 5b 5d, we can see that adding edges is more effective
than deleting edges in our attack. The attack on DeepWalk has higher transferability compared with
other four methods (including LINE2nd). Comparing the decrease of AP score for all five methods,
we can see that GAE is more robust against transferability based attacks.
7 CASE STUDY: ATTACK DEEPWALK ON COAUTHOR NETWORK
In this section, we conduct a case study on a real-world coauthor network extracted from
DBLP (Tang et al., 2008). We construct a coauthor network from two different research com-
munities: machine learning & data mining (ML&DM), and security (Security). For each research
community, we select some conferences in each field: ICML, ICLR, NIPS, KDD, WWW, ICWD,
ICDM from ML&DM and IEEE S&P, CCS, Usenix and NDSS from Security. We sort the authors
according to the number of published papers and keep the top-500 authors that publish most papers
in each community, which eventually yields a coauthor network with 1,000 nodes in total. The con-
structed coauthor graph contains 27260 in-field edges and 1014 cross-field edges. We analyze both
integrity attack and availability attack on this coauthor network.
(a) Original Network
A
B
(b) Adversarial Goal
A
B
c d
e
f
g
h
i j
(c) Attack Example: Victims
Figure 6: Visualization for integrity attack. Green nodes denote authors from ML&DM commu-
nity and blue nodes denote authors from Security community. Nodes and their corresponding re-
searchers: A: John C. Mitchell; B: Trevor Hastie; c: Susan Landau; d: Michael Lesk; e: Hector
Garcia-Molina; f: Jure Leskovec; g: David D. Jensen; h: Thomas G. Dietterich; i: Matthew Fredrik-
son; j: Jiawei Han.
Integrity Attack We consider an indirect attack setting where the adversarial goal is to decrease the
score of a target node pair and the attacker’s action is deleting existing edges. We show the sub-
graph that contains the nodes in the target edge and 5 edges chosen by our algorithm, as well as the
nodes that coauthored more than 3 papers with them, e.g. frequent collaborators. We visualize the
original graph in Figure 6a. Green nodes represent ML&DM authors and blue nodes denote authors
from Security community.
In Figure 6b, we show the target node pair A and B. Node A denotes John C. Mitchell, a professor in
Stanford University from the security community and node B denotes Trevor Hastie, also a Stanford
professor, from the ML & DM community. After the attack, the similarity score of the target node
pair is reduced from 0.67 to 0.37. We make the following observations: 1) We find that the top
2 edges (d, e) and (e,f) chosen by our attack lie on the shortest path between A and B, which
corresponds to the intuitive understanding that cutting the paths connecting A with B makes it less
likely to predict that an edge exists between A and B; 2) We find that many of the edges chosen by
our algorithm are cross-field edges (figure 6c): edge (i, j) and edge (d, e). Considering how small a
proportion the cross-field edges consist of(3.6% of all edges), we hypothesize that cutting the cross-
field edges could impede the information flow between two communities and therefore making the
similarity score of cross-field link lower.
Availability Attack For availability attack, we analyze the adversary that add edges. It turns out
that our algorithm tends to add cross-field edges: for the top 40 added edges chosen by our attack
method, 39 are cross-field edges. We hypothesize that this is because adding more edges between
two communities can disrupt the existing information flow and therefore lead the learnt embedding
to carry incorrect information about the network structure.
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8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate data poisoning attack against unsupervised node embedding methods
and take the task of link prediction as an example. We study two types of data poisoning attacks
including integrity attack and availability attack. We propose a unified optimization framework to
optimally attack the node embedding methods for both types of attacks. Experimental results on
several real-world graphs show that our proposed approach can effectively attack the results of link
prediction by adding or removing a few edges. Results also show that the adversarial examples
discovered by our proposed approach are transferable across different node embedding methods.
Finally, we conduct a case study analysis to better understand our attack method. In the future, we
plan to study how to design effective defense strategies for node embedding methods.
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Appendices
A IMPLEMENTATION DETAIL
In this part, we discuss the initialization of weighted adjacency matrix in the projected gradient
descent step. From the formulation in section 5.1, if we initialize all cells which are initially 0 to 0.
Then there won’t be back-propagated gradient on these cells. (This is because Ω won’t contain these
cells.) To handle this issue, we initialize these cells with a small value, for example 0.001, which
allows the gradient on these cells to be efficiently computed.
B ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
B.1 INTEGRITY ATTACK
Here we show additional experimental results. Figure 7, 8 summarize the results of integrity attack
on Citeseer dataset. Figure 7 shows our results for direct integrity attack and Figure 8 shows our
results for indirect integrity attack.
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Figure 7: Result for direct integrity attack against DeepWalk and LINE on Citeseer dataset.
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Figure 8: Result for indirect integrity attack against DeepWalk on Citeseer dataset.
C AVAILABILITY ATTACK
Here we show additional results for availability attack. Table 2 shows the results of availability
attack on Citeseer dataset. Figure 9, 10 show additional results of transferability analysis.
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Action Model Baseline Attack Method
# added/deleted edges
25 50 100 150 200 250 300
Add
DeepWalk 0.940
random 0.940 0.936 0.935 0.940 0.937 0.941 0.942
degree sum 0.919 0.906 0.886 0.865 0.864 0.843 0.828
Opt-attack 0.810 0.706 0.601 0.536 0.493 0.461 0.433
LINE 0.938
random 0.931 0.934 0.925 0.925 0.923 0.926 0.936
degree sum 0.929 0.922 0.925 0.921 0.920 0.924 0.924
Opt-attack 0.912 0.863 0.788 0.725 0.658 0.621 0.570
Delete
DeepWalk 0.940
random 0.936 0.927 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.919 0.918
degree sum 0.932 0.936 0.927 0.924 0.921 0.919 0.922
shortest path 0.943 0.925 0.916 0.907 0.902 0.900 0.895
Opt-attack 0.923 0.914 0.897 0.884 0.867 0.860 0.832
LINE 0.938
random 0.923 0.919 0.915 0.898 0.900 0.887 0.893
degree sum 0.924 0.926 0.906 0.889 0.902 0.895 0.888
shortest path 0.907 0.919 0.899 0.915 0.884 0.884 0.891
Opt-attack 0.925 0.930 0.896 0.897 0.874 0.875 0.880
Table 2: Results for availability attack on Citeseer dataset. Here we report the AP score.
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.666 0.636 0.658 0.681 0.806
0.902 0.886 0.908 0.933 0.908
(a) Cora-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.876 0.890 0.890 0.895 0.923
0.910 0.898 0.905 0.923 0.933
(b) Cora-Del
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.601 0.572 0.597 0.693 0.787
0.808 0.788 0.807 0.873 0.875
(c) Citeseer-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.897 0.870 0.912 0.930 0.911
0.897 0.896 0.923 0.921 0.946
(d) Citeseer-Add
Figure 9: Result for transferability analysis of our attack on two datasets, where the number of
added/deleted edges is 100. X-axis indicates the method the attack is evaluated on. Y-axis includes
the methods to generate the attack and also the baseline. The format “Dataset — Type ” here is used
to label the each sub-caption. “Dataset” refers to dataset while “Type” refers to attacker’s action.
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DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.503 0.482 0.487 0.559 0.635
0.778 0.766 0.803 0.843 0.839
(a) Cora-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.917 0.909 0.925 0.932 0.922
0.835 0.847 0.844 0.859 0.919
0.879 0.861 0.894 0.895 0.915
(b) Cora-Del
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.433 0.410 0.434 0.523 0.649
0.623 0.570 0.627 0.689 0.736
(c) Citeseer-Add
DeepWalk LINE Node2vec SC GAE
Baseline
DeepWalk
LINE
0.940 0.938 0.961 0.962 0.943
0.832 0.830 0.868 0.881 0.887
0.860 0.880 0.885 0.909 0.935
(d) Citeseer-Add
Figure 10: Result for transferability analysis of our attack on two datasets, where the number of
added/deleted edges is 300. X-axis indicates the method the attack is evaluated on. Y-axis includes
the methods to generate the attack and also the baseline. The format “Dataset — Type ” here is used
to label the each sub-caption. “Dataset” refers to dataset while “Type” refers to attacker’s action.
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